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THE "INNOMINATE" EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A POST-MORTEM
I. INTRODUCTION

Hearsay, an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, is generally inadmissible in both Federal and Massachusetts
courts. Both court systems, however, recognize many discrete, categorical
exceptions to this exclusionary rule. For a hearsay statement to fall under
one of these categorical exceptions it must comply with a strict set of factual
characteristics. In addition to these exceptions, the Federal courts also recognize a "catch-all" exception to the rule against hearsay. For a hearsay
statement to fall within the catch-all exception, it need not possess the factual characteristics required by the categorical exceptions, it merely must be
trustworthy and necessary. Massachusetts, in a departure from the federal
practice, has emphatically rejected the catch-all (or "innominate") exception.
This Article will investigate the history and rationale of the catch-all
exception, in both the Federal Rules and Massachusetts case law. It will
touch upon the criticism of the Federal version of the catch-all exception
and the impact of this criticism upon the development of the Massachusetts
rules of evidence. The Article will conclude by arguing that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has never fully grappled with the reasoning of
the catch-all exception and has not adequately explained its decision to reject it.
II. HEARSAY

The rule excluding hearsay is considered fundamental to our legal system.' Hearsay is an out of court statement offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.' Hearsay is generally inadmissible in both Federal courts and Massachusetts courts.3

I

JOHN

H.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§ 1364(1H)(9) (James H.
Chadboum ed., rev. ed. 1974).
2 The Federal definition is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801(c); in Massachusetts hearsay has been defined as "an extrajudicial statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Commonwealth v.
Keizer, 385 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 n.4 (Mass. 1979).
3 FED. R. EVID. 802.; e.g., Commonwealth v. $14,200, 638 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Mass.
App. Ct., 1994); Commonwealth v. Adamides, 639 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994); Adoption of Kenneth, 580 N.E.2d 392, 393 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. I

The rule against hearsay reflects the importance that Anglo-American
law has placed on subjecting a witness to cross-examination. Cross examination has traditionally been seen as the most effective method of evaluating
a witness' sincerity, perception, memory, and of reducing ambiguity of that
witness' testimony.4 Since a hearsay declarant is not subject to crossexamination at the time a hearsay statement is made, the trier of fact cannot
properly assess the assertion for its trustworthiness.5 This lack of trustworthiness renders hearsay statements inadmissible.
Ill. CATEGORICAL EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY
The common law has long recognized that hearsay statements may acquire indicia of reliability as a result of the factual contexts in which they
are made. Hearsay statements with these indicia are considered by the
courts to be trustworthy, and therefore admissible, without need of cross
examination of the hearsay declarant.6 For example, underlying the "excited
utterance" exception to the hearsay rule is the belief that startling events
cause a state of excitement such that the declarant is unlikely to have the
composure required to concoct a lie. Statements made during this excited
state are considered free from the hearsay risk of insincerity and are therefore considered to be trustworthy without cross examination.7
Common law courts and practitioners have assembled these factual
contexts or circumstances into lists of discrete or "pigeonhole" exceptions to
the hearsay rule. 8 Each exception has its own name and set of requirements.
Any hearsay which did not fall within one of the recognized exceptions was
per se inadmissible. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, these exceptions
are codified and enumerated under Rules 803 and 804.9

Massachusetts,

4 Sincerity, perception, memory, and ambiguity are known as the four "testimonial

infirmities" or hearsay risks. Laurence Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARv. L. REv.
957, 958-61 (1974).
5 FED. R. EVID. art. 8 advisory committee's note.
6

FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.

7 FED. R. EvID. 803(2). The statement must relate to the source of the startling
event. Id.
8 For the first use of the term "pigeonhole" in Massachusetts, see Commonwealth

v. Sampson, 388 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
9 FED. R. EVID. 803 and 804. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note
("The present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify
nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial even though he may be available.").
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which has not codified its rules of evidence, does recognize numerous discrete exceptions to the hearsay rule.' °
IV. THE COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT OF CATCH-ALL

A small handful of courts eventually began excepting certain hearsay
statements from the operation of the hearsay rule on a case by case basis,
without creating new and discrete "pigeonhole" exceptions." These courts
employed the rationale underlying the categorical exceptions, which is that
some hearsay statements are trustworthy because of the context in which
they are made. These courts simply began asking whether a hearsay statement possesses the core requirement of all the discrete exceptions to the
hearsay rule: trustworthiness.
The most famous of these cases is Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.12 In Dallas, the Fifth Circuit determined that if hearsay
evidence bears sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and is
necessary, it can be excepted from the hearsay rule, despite its failure to fit
within one of the recognized hearsay exceptions and without the need for the
court to create a new exception. 3 In Dallas, an Alabama county attempted
10 PAUL J. LIACos,

HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE

§ 8 (Mark S. Brodin &

Michael Avery eds., 6th ed. 1994).
"1 United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 1969)
(admitting hearsay
which did not fall within recognized exception because not "subject to the basic dangers
that premise the exclusion of hearsay."); United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (admitting hearsay statement which failed to fall squarely within the
excited utterance or dying declaration exceptions because the hearsay was "made under
circumstances that conform to the general policies underlying the exceptions to the hearsay
rule"); United States v. Castellana, 349 F.2d 264, 276 (2nd Cir. 1965) (admitting hearsay
which fell within a recognized exception, but stating in dictum, "[w]e are loath to reduce
the corpus of hearsay rules to a straight-jacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be mechanically invoked regardless of the reliability of the proffered evidence.");
Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2nd Cir. 1913) (L. Hand, J.)
(admitting hearsay statement which fell outside established exceptions "upon principle"
because it "fulfiil[ed] both the requisites of an exception to the hearsay rule, necessity and
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness." (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw §§ 1421, 1422, 1690)); United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409, 413
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (admitting hearsay evidence on "general principle"); Perry v. Parker, 141
A.2d 883, 884 (N.H. 1958) (stating, "[t]he fundamental inquiry is not the name or number
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule but whether 'under the circumstances [the evidence]
satisfies the reasons which lie behind the exceptions."' (alteration in original) (quoting
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 633 (1954))); Gagnon v. Pronovost, 92 A.2d 904, 906 (N.H.
1952) (admitting hearsay not admissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay
rule because facts suggested "apparent trustworthiness").
12 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
13

Id. at 397.
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to collect fire insurance payments for a collapsed county clock tower which
the county claimed had been damaged by lightning. " The county produced
evidence of the lightning damage which included charred timber.15 The insurer refused to pay, claiming that the tower fell because of construction
defects. 6 To support its case and account for the charred timber, the insurance company introduced a fifty-eight year-old newspaper article which reported that the tower was damaged by fire during its construction. 7 The
evidence was admitted at trial and a verdict was returned in favor of the insurance company. 8 Dallas County appealed, but the admission of the
newspaper article was upheld. 9
The Fifth Circuit observed that the core requirements of all hearsay exceptions are necessity and trustworthiness." The newspaper article was
admitted after the court found that it was necessary because it was the only
evidence supporting the insurer's case in chief.2' The court deemed it trustworthy because the author had no motive to lie and an untruthful account of
the fire would have subjected the newspaper to ridicule. 22 The court concluded, "[w]e do not characterize this newspaper as a 'business record', nor
as an 'ancient document', nor as any other readily identifiable and happily
tagged species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary
and trustworthy. 2 3

14

Id. at 390.

is Id.
16

286 F.2d at 390.

17 Id. at
18

391.

Id.

19 Id.
20

at 390.
286 F.2d at 396. The court, following Wigmore, identified three circumstances

where hearsay statements possess trustworthiness independent of cross-examination:
Where the circumstances are such that a sincere and accurate statement
would naturally be uttered, and no plan of falsification be formed; where,
even though a desire to falsify might present itself, other considerations,
such as the danger of easy detection or the fear of punishment, would
probably counteract its force; where the statement was made under such
conditions of publicity that an error, if it had occurred, would probably
have been detected and corrected.
Id. at 397 (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1422 (3rd ed.)).
21 286 F.2d at 396-397.
22

Id.

23

Id. at 397-398.
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In so ruling, the court extended the underlying rationale of the various
discrete hearsay exceptions without using the exceptions themselves.2 4 This
case, and others like it, pronounced a standard for the admission of hearsay
based solely on the criteria of necessity and trustworthiness.
V. FEDERAL RULES CODIFICATION OF CATCH-ALL

Dallas had profound ramifications for the formulation of the hearsay
exceptions contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In 1975, Congress
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence. Prior to the adoption of the
rules, there was fierce debate over including the catch-all exception as part
of the rules themselves.2 5 Opponents argued that such exceptions would
destroy the rule against hearsay.26 Proponents feared that the exclusion of
the catch-all exception would have a stultifying effect on the development of
the law of evidence, and would forever limit the hearsay exceptions to those
listed in the rules. 27 After extensive debate, the proponents successfully introduced and adopted 803(24) and 804(b)5. 28 Rule 803(24) excepts hearsay
statements which are not covered by other enumerated exceptions, but which
have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness., ' 29 The hearsay evidence must also be the most probative evidence on point, and be ma24

Id. at 395-397.

25

See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7079; S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065; Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974),
reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7105.
26 Jo Ann Harris, Catch (24): Residual Hearsay, LrrIG., Fall 1985 at 10, 11.
27

Id.

28

Id. The distinction between 803(24) and 804(b)(5) is that 804(b)(5) applies only

when the declarant is unavailable. The text and underlying logic of both are the same, and
this article will not treat them separately.
29 FED. R. EVID. 803(24) states in full:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [is admissible], if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.
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terial.3" In addition, any party which plans to use a statement under 803(24)
must give advance notice of such plan to the adverse party. 3'
In the official comment to Rule 803(24), the Rules Committee advanced the belief that the catch-all exception was needed to keep the rules
from stagnating.32 Yet the committee cited Dallas to support the adoption
of the catch-all exception. 33 The rationale behind Dallas is not that the
catch-all exception is needed to prevent stagnation, but rather that the exception offers the court a flexible and sensible method of handling hearsay
statements which do not fall under any of the recognized categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule.
VI. INIrIAL REACTION TO CATCH-ALL N MASSACHUSETTS

The federal codification of the catch-all exception to the rule against
hearsay seems to have influenced Massachusetts practitioners. The first
case with any mention of the catch-all exception-referred to as the
"innominate" exception in Massachusetts 34 - appears in the same year as
the promulgation of the Federal Rules and cites to the Federal Rules.35 In
this case, Commonwealth v. White,36 the defendant was charged with armed
robbery, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of a narcotic. 37 The Commonwealth introduced a hearsay statement
by an alleged co-conspirator which implicated the defendant.38 The trial
court admitted the hearsay statement under an exception for assertions made
by a co-conspirator.3 9
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruled that the coconspirator rule did not apply because the statement was not made during
30 Id. "[T]he statement [must be] more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts." Id.
31 Id.
32 FED. R. EvID. 803(24) advisory committee's note. The committee explained
"[i]t
would .... be presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule have been cataloged and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a
closed system." Id.
33

Id.

34 "Innominate" is defined as "not named or classed; belonging to no specific class."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 789 (6th ed. 1990).
35 Commonwealth v. White, 352 N.E.2d 904 (Mass. 1976).
36 Id.
37
38

Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.

39 352 N.E.2d at 907.
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the pendency and furtherance of a conspiracy. 4 During appellate argument,
the Commonwealth urged the court to recognize an "innominate exception"
similar to Federal Rule 803(24), and admit the evidence." The court, however, declined to recognize the innominate exception in this case because the
hearsay statement was untrustworthy (the declarant, an alleged coconspirator, had a motive to lie), and it was not necessary to the Commonwealth's case (the Commonwealth had no explanation for its failure to produce the hearsay declarant at trial).42
In essence, the court rejected the Commonwealth's use of the innominate exception because the facts of the case did not fit the Federal Rules
formulation of the exception. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court virtually
accepted the innominate exception when it stated, "[wle agree that the hearsay rule and its stated exceptions should not be regarded as a closed system
without room for variations in particular cases on reasoned grounds."43
The White approach was followed in the 1980 case of Commonwealth
v. Meech.44 In Meech, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.45 At the trial, the defendant-who did not deny that he killed the victim-offered the grand jury
testimony of an acquaintance that shortly after the killing the defendant had
threatened the acquaintance with a knife but then made amorous advances
toward him.' This evidence of his disturbed mental state, the defendant
argued, would have proven that the he lacked the mens rea necessary for
conviction of first degree murder.47 The defendant attempted to have the
statement admitted under the prior recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule, but the trial court refused to admit it.48 The defendant was con49
victed.
On appeal, the SJC echoed the words of White by declaring that the
Massachusetts rules of evidence are flexible: "we do not regard the common
4oId. at 911.
41

Id. The Commonwealth argued that such admission would "be in a large sense

compatible with sundry recognized hearsay exceptions, and would otherwise be fair." Id.
42 Id.
43

352 N.E.2d at 911.

44

403 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1980).
Id. at 1176.

45

46 Id. at 1177.
47
48
49

Id.
403 N.E.2d at 1177.
Id. at 1176.
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law hearsay exceptions as frozen in their established contours, and have
been prepared on suitable occasions to venture forth [to establish new exceptions]."5 Despite this language, the court rejected the defendant's argument because the catch-all exception was not argued before the trial judge.5
In addition, the court added that, as in White, the facts of the case did not fit
the requirements of the federal formulation of the catch-all exception because of the statement's lack of trustworthiness and because there was more
probative evidence than the hearsay.5" The court also noted that the matter
was under consideration by the Proposed Rules of Massachusetts Evidence
Committee.5 3
In neither White nor Meech was the court hostile to the innominate exception. Instead, the SJC seemed to be waiting for the appropriate facts to
present themselves before the court would be willing to adopt the Federal
Rules formulation of the catch-all exception. After White and Meech were
decided, however, the Federal catch-all exception became the subject of severe criticism.5 4 This criticism had a profound effect on the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence Committee's view of the catch-all exception
which, in turn, shaped the future of the SJC's outlook toward the exception.
VII. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS

Federal courts began grappling with the implications of the catch-all
exception almost immediately after the rules were promulgated in 1976.
Legal commentators were distressed with the results.55 The criticism of the
catch-all exception focused less on the theory underlying catch-all and more
on the way the rules have been applied by the courts. In general, legal observers noted that the rules were being misread and misapplied, resulting in
a flood of incorrectly admitted hearsay.56

50

Id. at 1179.

51 Id.
52

403 N.E.2d at 1179 n.12.

53 Id.
54 See discussion

infra part VII.

55 E.g., James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 787 (1993); Joseph W. Rand, Note, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal
HearsayRule: the Futile andMisguided Attempt to Restrain JudicialDiscretion, 80 GEO.
L.J. 873 (1992); David A. Soneshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay
Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982).
56 See Beaver, supra note 55, at 819 (arguing that the standards are too vague);

Harris, supra note 27, at 11 (stating that busy district court judges do not have time to
articulate reasons for their evidentiary decisions and are merely paying lip service to the
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The catch-all requires that the hearsay have "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness,"5 7 but commentators observed that many courts have
mistakenly found this trustworthiness by analyzing factors extrinsic to the
evidence itself, such as the availability of another witness to corroborate the
hearsay declaration.5" The Federal courts have also admitted "near misses,"
hearsay which almost fits the requirements of an enumerated exception to
the hearsay rule but which is brought in under the catch-all provision. 9
Commentators and a few courts complain that the admission of these near
misses eviscerates the enumerated exceptions.6 ° Under Rule 803(24) the
hearsay must be "more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts."' Courts have found this requirement satisfied in cases where the
hearsay simply helps the jury decide the factual issues of the case.62 The
practical effect of this loose standard is to admit cumulative evidence.6 3 The
notice requirement is ignored, which results in surprise and disadvantage of
opposing counsel.64 Overall, the criticisms of the commentators are more
focused on the application of the catch-all exception than at the concept of
catch-all.
VIII. REJECTION OF CATCH-ALL IN PROPOSED MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF
EVIDENCE

Criticism of the federal catch-all exception coincided with the formulation of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. In 1976, the Supreme Judicial Court appointed an Advisory Committee to consider

rule); Rand, supra note 55, at 879 (arguing the catch-all exceptions are "poorly drafted
and unrealistically stringent").
57 FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
58 See Soneshein, supra note 55, at 879.
59 See Soneshein, supra note 55, at 885; Gary W. Majors, Comment, Admitting

'NearMisses' Under the Residual HearsayExceptions, 66 OR. L. RaV. 599 (1987).
60 Id.
61 FED. R. EVID.

803(24).

62

See Soneshein, supra note 55, at 890.

63

See id. at 891.

64

See Harris, supra note 27 at 12; see generally, Myma S. Raeder, The Effect of the

Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and
Is Devoured, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 925 (1992); Lizbeth A. Turner, Comment, Admission
of GrandJury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TuL. L. REV. 1033
(1985).
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codification of the Massachusetts Rules of Evidence.65 Four years later, the
Advisory Committee submitted Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence
to the Court.66 The proposed rules generally tracked the form and substance
of the Federal Rules.67 Ultimately, however, the Committee voted against
adopting the federal catch-all exception.68
The Advisory Committee provided three reasons for refusing to adopt
the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. First, in an apparent reference to
the criticism leveled by legal commentators, the Committee noted the controversial nature of the exception.69 Secondly, many of the states which
have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence chose not to adopt the exceptions.7" The third reason given was that the exception was unnecessary "[iun
view of the common law power of the courts to fashion new exceptions to
the hearsay rule., 71 The committee concluded that recognition of the exception "may provoke more problems than it is intended to solve" and
that
"recognition of new exceptions is best left to case law development., 72
IX. CURRENT MASSACHUSETrS ATnTrUDE TOWARDS CATCH-ALL

The rejection of the innominate exception by the Advisory Committee
signaled the exception's death knell in the Massachusetts courts. In cases
65

Supreme Judicial Court, Announcement Concerning The Proposed Massachusetts

Rules of Evidence (SJC-2787, Dec. 30, 1982) [hereinafter SJC Announcement], reprinted
in Kenneth B. Hughes, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE app. I at 508 (William G. Young et al.
eds., Supp. 1992).
66

Id.

67

Robert J. Ambrogi, SJC Carves Exception to Hearsay-Ban Rule, MASS. LAW.

WKLY., Aug. 24, 1992, at 1 (quoting advisory committee member Stephen N. Subrin: "Our
operating assumption was that we would try to track the federal rules unless there was a
Massachusetts case or statute saying otherwise.").
68 Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(24) advisory committee's note. The Proposed Massachusetts Rules are reprinted in JOHN J. MCNAUGHT & J. HAROLD FLANNERY, MASSACHUSETrS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM REFERENCE (1988 & Supp. 1992).
69 Id.

71

Id.
Id.

72

Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(24) advisory committee's note (citing Common-

70

wealth v. Carr, 369 N.E.2d 970 (Mass. 1977) in which the SJC rejected the traditional
common law distinction between a statement against pecuniary interest and a statement
against penal interest.) On December 30, 1982, the Supreme Judicial Court announced
that a majority of the justices did not favor adoption of the Proposed Rules, because it was
felt that "promulgation of rules of evidence would tend to restrict the development of
common law principles pertaining to the admissibility of evidence." SJC Announcement,
supra note 65.
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tried before the Proposed Rules were drafted (White and Meech), the SJC
operated with an open mindedness about the exception, refusing to apply the
exception only because the facts did not fit the Federal Rules formulation.
After the Advisory Committee rejected catch-all, the courts no longer applied the facts of the cases to the Federal Rules; instead, they simply began
to reject the exception.
This change is evident in the first case to consider the innominate exception after the Proposed Rules were formulated, Commonwealth v.
Pope 3. In Pope, a woman had shot her husband and then killed herself with
a weapon supplied by the defendant. 74 The defendant was charged with being an accessory to murder in the first degree." To convict the defendant
the Commonwealth had to prove the woman had murdered her husband,
which prosecutors did by introducing the woman's suicide note containing
the hearsay statement "I killed [my husband]. 76 The court admitted the
statement as a declaration against penal interest and the defendant was convicted.77
The defendant appealed admission of the suicide note, and the SJC
ruled that the statement was improperly admitted under the exception for
declarations against penal interest.7" The Commonwealth responded that the
innominate exception should apply. 79 The court flatly rejected the application of the innominate exception, stating that it could "see no reason to
adopt the rather broad Federal formulation as a general rule.""s The court
adopted the Proposed Rules Committee position, stating that the federal
formulation of catch-all "has been marked by conflicting and illogical results" and had been met with considerable disapprobation by legal commentators. 8'

491 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1986).
74 Id. at 241-242.
73

75
76

77
78

Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
491 N.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 243. The court reasoned that because the note was written by a person

about to commit suicide, it could not be said to have subjected the declarant to the possibility of criminal liability, and thus did not possess the requisite indicia of reliabilitysincerity- for this exception.
80

Id. at 244.
Id.

81

Id. at 244 (citing Soneshein, supra note 55 and Harris, supra note 27.)

79
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Pope is a radical departure from the court's previous attitude towards
the catch-all exception. In White and Meech the court seemed willing to recognize the innominate exception should the appropriate facts present themselves.
Conversely, in Pope the court for the first time expressed
dissatisfaction with the rule.82
The decision in Pope signaled the demise of the innominate exception
to the hearsay rule in Massachusetts. Since Pope, the exception has been
argued three times before the Massachusetts Courts of Appeal and rejected
each time. 3 In 1992 the SJC again rejected the exception in Commonwealth v. Costello.8 4
X. ARGUMENT

In rejecting the innominate exception, the Massachusetts courts focused
too closely on criticism of the Federal Rules formulation, and failed to thoroughly analyze the rationale underlying catch-all and to acknowledge its
common law pedigree.
The catch-all exception developed in case law prior to the codification
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A number of common law courts determined that despite the power of judges to formulate new categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule, no list of exceptions could ever encompass the full
range of trustworthy hearsay evidence which might be introduced at trial.
While the use of categorical exceptions would still be useful, some trustworthy hearsay had to be excepted on a case by case basis.
The assertion, therefore, by the Advisory Committee and the SJC that
the innominate exception is unnecessary because of the common law power
of Massachusetts courts to fashion new exceptions to the hearsay rule

82 491 N.E.2d at 244.
83 Commonwealth v. $14,200, 638 N.E.2d 45, 47 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) ("It

should be noted... that Massachusetts courts do not recognize the innominate exception
to the hearsay rule as does Fed.R.Evid. 802(24)." (citing Commonwealth v. Costello, 582
N.E.2d 938 (Mass. 1991))); Simmons v. Yurchak, 551 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Mass. App. Ct.
1990) (describing the innominate exception as "an exception prominently absent from the
proposed Massachusetts rules."); In re Custody of Jennifer, 517 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1988) (citing Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(24) advisory committee's note and
observing that they "specifically rejected the innominate exception provision found in
Fed.R.Evid. 803(24).").
84 Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Mass. 1991) (stating that the
SJC does not "recognize the innominate exception to the hearsay rule," and comparing
case sub judice with United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 609 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S. Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988), where similar hearsay was
found to be admissible under 803(24)).
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misses the point. This assertion is, in fact, belied by the common law parentage of the catch-all exception.
In any case, the criticism of the Federal catch-all provisions were leveled at their wording and the application, not their underlying rationale, and
not their common law heritage. But it is this criticism of the application of
the Federal Rules which forms the basis of the Advisory Committee's rejection of catch-all. And it is the Advisory Committee's rejection of catch-all
which is the basis of the rejection of the rule by the SJC. In what might be
called judicial non-feasance, the Massachusetts courts have never grappled
with the underlying rationale or history of the catch-all exception and have,
instead, allowed the rules committee to decide the issue for them.
XI. CONCLUSION

In the years before the Advisory Committee on the proposed rules of
evidence offered their recommendations, the SJC of Massachusetts expressed an open minded approach towards recognizing an innominate exception to the hearsay rule. This exception, developed in state and Federal
case law and recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence, permits admission of hearsay on the basis of its inherent trustworthiness and necessity,
even though it may fall outside the commonly accepted discrete categories of
hearsay exceptions.
After the proposed rules rejected the innominate exception, the Massachusetts courts changed their outlook from one of open mindedness to one of
flat rejection of the exception. The courts, taking their cue from the Advisory Committee, based their decision on criticism of the wording and implementation of the Federal catch-all rules, while ignoring its common law
heritage and failing to grapple with the rationale of the exception. In light of
renewed calls for the codification of Massachusetts evidence rules 5 and

85

See Editorial, A Code of Evidence, MASS. LAw. WKLY., Sep. 7, 1992, at 10. The

editorial argues:
Absence of codified rules of evidence leads to confusion and disharmony
among trial lawyers and judges . .. [c]odification of these rules will enhance uniformity of practice within the state courts and promote uniformity
between state and federal practice. Codification will also reduce the time
spent by lawyers and judges researching and litigating evidentiary questions. By enhancing uniformity and reducing litigation, codification will
ultimately improve the delivery of justice in this state.
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continued pressure on the courts to admit certain kinds of compelling hearsay, it remains to be seen whether this commitment to discrete categories of
hearsay exceptions will last.
Devin W. Smith

